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The Opening of the State Security Archives of Central and Eastern Europe
There are important differences between the various countries, but, generally speaking, the institutions which hold the former state security records have four tasks:
(a) to enable the connections of public officials with the former Communist security and intelligence services to be investigated so that those who did collaborate with those services can be removed from public office ("lustration", as it is called);
(b) to make available to targets of surveillance and repression the records held on them;
(c) to make records available for the prosecution of those who committed crimes during the period of Communist rule; and (d) to enable historians and journalists to write the history of Communist surveillance and repression.
Broadly speaking, these four tasks serve the purposes of building stable democratic institutions which enjoy public trust and of giving victims of the Communist security services a measure of retrospective justice.
2
Vetting and lustration
All societies where totalitarian dictatorships have collapsed or been overthrown have faced the problem of finding a way of reconciling their many victims with their many collaborators. Since the Communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe were overthrown in a wave of revolution, the demand that the security services' collaborators be exposed was strong. Many -though not all -of the triumphant democrats believed that their countries' political and economic health depended on either removing ex-Communists from political and economic life or at least on knowing who they were. They wanted to encourage their peoples to have trust in the new democratic institutions, which needed, therefore, to function transparently. They also wanted them to have trust in one another, which their societies had lacked in Communist times. Building a social and political order which had clearly overcome the harm the Communists had done would also assist reconciliation with them (those who favoured opening the state security archives had to counter the claim that keeping them closed would assist reconciliation between the two wings of society).
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This view of exposing police informers was expressed by the Romanian historian Vladimir Tismaneanu, when he commented, "Reconciliation cannot be attained through the reproduction of lies". 3 The Polish Solidarity leader Adam Michnik expressed the same view with his aphorism, "Amnesty yes, amnesia no". For some years after 1989-91 there was also a fear that the new democratic systems might be overthrown by the Communists; the exposure of informers and security officials was seen as essential to secure democracy.
Owing to the security services' central role in the Communist regimes (and in particular in their infringements of human rights), any vetting process would inevitably rely very heavily on state security records. Of course, the Communists and their many collaborators were always going to resist this so as to prevent their participation in discredited regimes from being exposed. Many of those involved in the civil rights movements that overthrew them were also hostile to the archives being opened because they did not want their collaboration with the security services to become public knowledge either. 4 Nevertheless, in most of the countries of the former Soviet Bloc there have been moves to vet those in public office and remove them for a time from their positions.
These lustration policies are the direct successors of the denazification policy pursued by the victorious Allies in their occupation zones in Germany after the Second World War.
In Germany, the ex-Communists' ability to resist this was particularly small since the German Democratic Republic (GDR) ceased to exist and the united German state had 5 a strong judicial system and a very anti-Communist political culture. The strength of the judicial system came from its self-confidence, the explicit commitment in the Federal Republic's Basic Law to the rule of law and respect for legal rights, a long German legal tradition, and the deference of German politicians to judicial authority.
None of these exist in Romania. Moreover, in sharp contrast to Romania, the East German security service, the Stasi, ceased to exist after the revolution which overthrew the Communist regime and the East German civil rights movement seized many of its record depositories. 5 The Unification Treaty between the two German states, concluded in August 1990, provided that any who had collaborated with or worked for the Stasi or engaged in violations of human rights should be removed from public office if their actions were sufficiently serious to make them "appear unsuitable" for it. 6 The German Parliament, the Bundestag, advanced the lustration process in December 1991, when it passed its Law on the Stasi Records (Stasi-Unterlagen-Gesetz, StUG).
The law is severe, providing for wide-ranging vetting of those in the public service.
The public service is construed broadly, extending from politicians, judges and army officers to teachers and civil servants. There has also been limited vetting of those in leading positions in the private sector. Those subject to vetting can be denied jobs or dismissed from positions they already have. Vetting concerns only collaboration with the former GDR's State Security Ministry, not membership of the communist party, the Socialist Unity Party, even though the former served the latter. The reasoning behind this is that the party had had so many members that exclusion of all of them from employment would not have been practicable. The moral reasoning is that the law uncovers betrayal. Of course, this means that the lustration process often 6 penalizes people who did very little harm to others, while no penalty at all falls on many Communist Party bosses who did great harm. 7 This is even more the case when an informer acted under duress or the pressure of other mitigating circumstances.
Lustration creates a social distinction between "good" and "bad" people which, firstly, is deeply resented by many of the latter and, secondly, can be hard to reconcile with the facts of a particular case. In 2011, by the eighth amendment to the StUG, the Bundestag extended until 2019 the responsibility for vetting of the Federal Commissioner (BStU) entrusted with the Stasi's records. 9 That his/her responsibility will have lasted at least eighteen years and been repeatedly extended is a mark of how much public support the process enjoys.
The BStU has no responsibility for lustration: the BStU merely informs employers who apply for information whether the Stasi held information on the person concerned and what it was. What to do about the person concerned is the responsibility of the employer. Many former Stasi informers have not, in fact, been dismissed from their positions in the public service because their work has not been regarded as harmful enough. Estimates of the number of dismissals on this ground vary. One is that by 1996 between 60,000 and 100,000 people had been dismissed from their jobs for collaboration of one kind or another with the Stasi. Another puts the figure at just over 10,000.
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The Czech law was also passed quickly (in 1991). It was also severe, providing that not only security officials and secret police informers but also Communist Party officials were to be excluded for five years from both public office and prominent 7 positions in the private sector. This prohibition was not dependent on any participation by these people in infringements of human rights.
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Poland settled on a moderate approach. Its first triumphant pro-democratic politicians came to power by negotiation with the Communist regime and were therefore attracted to the "Spanish model" of forgiving and forgetting. They decided not to revisit the past and Poland was slow to adopt a lustration law. It finally had to because the policy of drawing a line under the past lacked public support. Moreover, Polish politics were repeatedly racked in the 1990s by allegations that leading politicians had been secret police informers; rather than reflecting historical facts, these allegations were simply political weapons. Only authoritative rulings on their pasts could put a stop to the scandals. The country's first lustration law entered into force in 1997. It applied to the leading positions in the public service. Those affected had to submit declarations recording any collaboration on their part with the Communist-era security service. The law provided for exclusion from employment, but only if those concerned lied on their lustration certificates. To ensure that the state security records were not used for political purposes, they were transferred to an independent institution, the Institute for National Remembrance.
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The Hungarian and Romanian laws were milder still, providing only for disclosure of the past of those concerned and not for their mandatory exclusion from employment.
The Hungarian law was passed in 1994, the Romanian in 1999. The Hungarian law provided that the names of former informers elected to public office would be made public if they did not quickly resign from that position. In practice, no public official found to be an informer has resigned, either before or after the finding of his 8 collaboration has been made public -in other words, there has been no lustration of the public service. 13 The result of each Romanian vetting procedure is published in a government journal, the Monitorul Oficial. Someone who was once an officer or informer of the Securitate is not automatically dismissed; it is, rather, hoped that he will resign. 14 As will become apparent, this hope has, as in Hungary's case, not been fulfilled. Partly this has been to protect itself and its personnel; partly it has been to protect institutions like Parliament, the government and the Presidency, in which many former security personnel ("securişti", as they are called) now work.
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Such was the reluctance of the Romanian intelligence services to hand over their records that, in practice, there was no public access to state security files until 2006.
Although many files were handed over to CNSAS that year, many were retained on the ground of national security (a term which the government has not defined). The files of the leading politicians were retained on that ground, which contradicted the purpose of the law. Even after the records were transferred to it, the Council encountered considerable difficulties which have often prevented it from reaching authoritative conclusions on whether people being vetted did collaborate with the secret police. Many files are still withheld from it; others are incomplete; incriminating information has been removed by the SRI, since the revolution of 1989, from still more; it has been suggested that files have been tampered with to discredit as Securitate informers people who had no connection with it; the SRI has also repeatedly failed to comply with the Council's requests for information. It has withheld key information from the Council (including the card index which would have enabled informers' codenames to be matched against their real names).
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The information about the Securitate pasts of leading politicians which has come to light has often served partisan political purposes. While the files of leading CNSAS's first task was (until 2008) to vet candidates for political office and those who hold, or apply for, jobs in the civil or public services. It proved to be incompetent, partisan and unfair in discharging this responsibility. It was partisan because the eleven members of its governing College are nominated by the leading political parties. 21 It disregarded legal safeguards given to those undergoing vetting.
Consequently, there was little confidence amongst the Romanian public that its findings were correct. The Council's second task (which continues) is to make secret police files available to those they concern; it has proven to be incompetent in the discharge of this responsibility as well. The National Council's rulings on whether people subject to vetting were informers did not win public confidence, in part because it does not have access to the Securitate's entire archive and so no decision that such a person was not an informer can be entirely conclusive. Likewise, the Council is known to have cleared of collaboration with the Securitate committed Communists who very probably were informers (it had to clear them because it could not find documentary evidence of their collaboration in the archive). The Council was not able to reach any conclusion in other cases because records have been withheld from it on the ground of national security. Most fundamentally, it has been unable to reveal the extent to which former officers and informers of the Securitate are active in contemporary Romanian politics, even though that is its job. This continues to be the subject of rumour and allegation. 25 Since jobs in the Romanian intelligence services are not among those subject to lustration, the Council has not even been able to establish how many officers of the post-Communist intelligence services served in the Securitate. 26 Its record is so bad that in recent elections private organizations have researched the candidates'
independence from the Securitate and have published the results. The lack of any effective lustration has encouraged successive incoming governments to conduct mass dismissals of public employees. However, these have been intended simply to remove political opponents. 27 The Romanian political and judicial systems have both obstructed exposure of those who worked for the Securitate. Romania has no tradition of effective or impartial justice and the judiciary has refused to prosecute people who have submitted false declarations of non-collaboration with the Securitate. forwarded their lists of electoral candidates to the Council for inspection late. Of those candidates it was able to vet in the time (4,500), 10% were discovered to have informer files, but the Council went on to rule that only 38 (less than 1%) had actually been either officers or informers of the Securitate. Those identified seemed to have been chosen to discredit the pro-democracy coalition which was then in power: twothirds of those exposed came from its ranks. Moreover, no prominent former
Communists were identified; indeed, those exposed included former political prisoners. Six of the 38 were elected to parliament despite their pasts. The main party in the pro-democracy coalition, the Christian Democrats, did badly in the parliamentary elections and failed to qualify for parliamentary representation. 30 The entire future of lustration in Romania is now uncertain owing to the Constitutional Court's hostility to it. In 2008 the Court held that the existing provision for lustration infringed the constitution, nullified all findings that the National Council had made up to then and opened up the possibility that it might order CNSAS to end 14 its work. In response, the government transferred to the courts the responsibility for making findings as to whether people had been informers. The Romanian Parliament tried in 2012 to put lustration on a legislative basis again, but the Constitutional Court declared the proposed bill to be unconstitutional because it denied some citizens the opportunity of holding elected positions, infringed the principle on non-retroactivity and attributed collective guilt to all informers equally, which it held to be unlawful (it reasoned that guilt had to be individual). This reasoning seems politically motivated.
What prospects lustration has of continuing are unclear. 31 Serious disagreement between the government and the courts over lustration has not been confined to Romania. Corruption has proven to be such a persistent problem in Poland (as in Romania and elsewhere) and resentment at the former Communists'
continuing influence in business and politics has been so great that in 2007 its conservative government attempted a second wave of lustration. Former Communist officials and security officers were seen as responsible for widespread, high-level corruption in business, which was put down to lustration having been too limited in the past. A new law extended the scope of vetting to the whole of the public service (not only important political positions) and to some positions in the private sector.
The result was to expand the category of people required to complete a vetting certificate from 27,000 people in important jobs to all public servants born before 1
August 1972 -some hundreds of thousands of people. The vetting process would also have led to restrictions being placed on the affected person's employment even by private employers. However, the Polish Constitutional Court struck down the central provisions of the law as unconstitutional. 32 
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The early trend in lustration was to keep confidential the information used. Lustration was intended to be a legal procedure subject to strict requirements of due process.
However, this undermined public faith in the process and the trend now is towards making the information used publicly available. Under Poland's 1997 lustration law, information was not to be published for thirty years. The later legislation provided for the security service files to be published on the Internet.
Public access to state security records
Granting individuals who were targets of surveillance the right to see the information . 37 Subsequent amendments have widened the public's right to read the files. crimes which were so at the times the acts in question were committed. Consequently, it laid down that prosecutions were to take place for infringements of paragraphs common to the penal codes of both the Federal Republic and the GDR. Where the two penal codes differed, the accused was to be tried under that which was more favourable to the accused. The prosecutions were difficult ones because they were evidently prompted, not by the infringement of the law of a state which no longer existed, but by a sense of moral outrage that had nothing to do with the GDR's legal code. 39 Many of the Communist leaders actually died before they could be tried or were too old and frail to stand trial. The same is true of former judges and prosecutors, who therefore could not be tried for perverting justice in the service of the regime (this category of crime is called "Rechtsbeugung" in German). 40 The decision to prosecute put a premium on access to reliable East German records, including ones of the Stasi. The Ministry's records were, after 1991, the principal source for the tens of thousands of investigations that took place into a wide range of possible crimes.
Over a ten-year period, prosecutors investigated more than 65,000 cases of injustice in East Germany during the GDR period and considered prosecution for many crimes, One group of people who were investigated were the GDR's judges and state prosecutors, who had applied the GDR's criminal law expressly to persecute dissidents and maintain the Communist regime in power ("Rechtsbeugung"). Another were former officers of the Stasi, who had done terrible harm to many people (this category of crime was called "SED-Unrecht" -Communist injustice). The third main group were those responsible for the GDR's border regime, under which border guards had been required to shoot dead unarmed East Germans who were trying to flee the GDR (this category was called "Gewalttaten an der innerdeutschen Grenze" -acts of violence at the inner-German border).
Particularly disturbing instances of politically-motivated persecution by judges and prosecutors were: the so-called "Waldheim trials" of 1950 in which not only Nazi war criminals but also opponents of the Communist regime were tried (and in some cases put to death); the legal persecutions of the victims of the purges of the 1950s, which particularly affected high Party officials and industrial managers; the trials of later, high-profile dissidents such as Robert Havemann and Rudolf Bahro; and the prosecutions of people who had tried to escape from the GDR, West Germans who had helped them and those who, from the mid-1970s on, had applied to emigrate to the West. 41 In the overwhelming majority of cases (almost 90%), no prosecution was brought, usually because of the ruling of Germany's highest court for criminal and civil cases, the Bundesgerichtshof (BGH, Federal Supreme Court), that a crime could only be considered to have been committed if the misapplication of the GDR's law had been extreme. 42 The Stasi's staff were investigated for many and varied crimes. These included: the kidnapping, murder or attempted murder of people who had organized the escape of East Germans from the GDR, and of defectors from the Stasi and border guard, and of dissidents; electoral fraud; unlawful opening of post; unlawful administration of drugs to sportspeople; and crimes arising from the maltreatment of prisoners, maltreatment of demonstrators, the forced resettlement of East Germans living on the border with West Germany, and the suppression of the popular uprising of June 1953. Stasi officers were also investigated for the covert actions they had carried out to demoralize and harass East Germans (for example, by ensuring that they were dismissed from their jobs or by encouraging their friends and neighbours to turn on them). These covert actions did grave psychological harm to many.
Most Stasi officers and informers were not prosecuted because, however much harm they did to others, they could not be found to have broken the GDR's law so gravely 20 that they could be prosecuted for perversion of justice (indeed, in many cases they could not be found to have broken the law of the GDR at all). As far as their participation in covert actions was concerned, for the most part prosecutions could not be brought, either because they involved no action that was criminal under any applicable law or because they were not unlawful under the GDR's law or because the Stasi officers concerned had been of such low rank that they were considered not to have been responsible for the operations. 43 However, some Stasi officers were convicted of crimes (and thanks to their own Ministry's records). Among them were the GDR's long-serving State Security Minister, Erich Mielke, and its equally longserving foreign intelligence chief, Markus Wolf. Mielke was sentenced to a prison term for two murders committed in 1931. 44 The most prominent prosecutions were of those in the third group: former Communist leaders and border guards accused of the unlawful killing of would-be escapees at the border. The prosecutors concluded from their investigations that, in all, 270 people had been killed trying to flee across the inner-German border during the period of Germany's division (237 died of gunshot wounds; a further 33 tripped on mines).
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The trials took place in a political and popular atmosphere fiercely hostile to the accused, making their acquittal unlikely. Although the German courts respected the prohibition on retroactive legislation, their legal reasoning displayed considerable creativity and they were, in practice, able to overcome it. In scores of trials, border guards who had shot fleeing East Germans and the high Communist officials who had given the orders requiring them to do so raised the defence that their actions had been lawful under the law of the GDR. 46 This defence failed; they were still convicted of 21 having killed them unlawfully. 47 The last Socialist Unity Party General Secretary Egon Krenz, the one-time GDR Defence Minister Heinz Keßler, and the army chief of staff Fritz Streletz were all sentenced to terms of imprisonment because they were considered to have been indirectly responsible for these killings. The German courts insisted that GDR law did not authorize the killing of unarmed people who posed no threat to the lives of others. The Bundesgerichtshof and Germany's highest constitutional court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court), maintained that the GDR's constitution and international human rights treaties the GDR had signed required that the state protect the life of each individual;
consequently, the GDR's laws could not be interpreted as authorizing its officials and armed forces to infringe human rights.
The German courts received crucial support from the European Court of Human
Rights, to which Krenz, Keßler and Streletz appealed on the ground that the Federal Republic had infringed the prohibition on retroactive legislation. The European Court decided that the GDR's border regime had been designed to kill and harm wouldescapees; consequently, it infringed rights (particularly the rights to life and free movement) enshrined in both the GDR's own constitution and in international human rights treaties signed by the GDR. The appellants had, therefore, infringed both GDR law and international law in force at the time and their criminal convictions were fully justified. 48 The GDR's (insincere) commitment to human rights protection was so clear that, in a later case, three former Politburo members were found guilty of manslaughter because they were held not to have discharged their duty actively to persuade the Politburo to make the state's border regime more humane. The
Bundesgerichtshof held that this duty followed from the accused's positions in the Politburo. 49 The reality is that, in these cases, the German courts were disregarding GDR law and instead requiring compliance with international human rights law. -159 were of judges and lawyers who had worked in the GDR's judicial system. In all, there were 226 accused. The most important prosecutions were those of former judges of the GDR's Supreme Court (Oberstes Gericht) and former prosecutors. These people were prosecuted for perversion of justice.
Only 53 of the accused were actually convicted of crimes and most of these did not have to go to jail.
-72 were of former officers of the Stasi (there were 101 accused in these proceedings). Only 33 were convicted of crimes; only one of these went to jail.
-23 prosecutions concerned the unlawful administration of drugs to athletes and were of the officials, doctors and athletic coaches involved. There were 49 accused in all. 36 were convicted, but no one went to jail. 24 terms of imprisonment were handed down but they were all suspended. 
History-writing and journalism
The Stasi's files are expressly, by law, to be made available to historians, journalists and other researchers to ensure that the long-secret role of the Stasi in maintaining the Communist regime in power is revealed to its victims and the whole world. This task is becoming an increasingly important one for the BStU since, firstly, its responsibility for vetting will end in the future and, secondly, most of those on whom the Stasi kept a file and who want to read it have already done so, making this also a declining area of activity for the agency.
To ensure that historical research was undertaken, the Law on the Stasi Records Romanian Information Service long claimed that about 100,000 informers reported to the Securitate. This figure is believed to be far too small. 62 There are no reliable figures for the size of the informant network after 1989.
These uncertainties do not exist in the German case. The size of the Stasi, including its network, is known: some 174,000 informers in 1989, reporting to a full-time staff of 102,000 officers. 63 Lavinia Stan, the leading authority on Romania's efforts to come to terms with its Communist past, claims that Romania had a larger informer network, relative to the population's size, than East Germany. This is unlikely to have been the case. 64 
Conclusion
The force driving the opening of the state security archives has been political: the determination to de-communize. Since much Communist repression took place secretly, the opening of state security records has been essential to de-communization.
The main benefit is also political. This is seen in all four processes the state security archives have served. Germany has derived the biggest benefit because it has had the political and judicial will to take effective measures of de-communization. The other former Communist states have been less successful in banishing the ghost of Communism. The one striking success throughout Central and Eastern Europe is that the opening of the files has led to no acts of vengeance against state security officers or informers. 65 Lustration was meant to encourage social trust in democratic institutions. Germany was very fortunate in being able to move forward quickly with it, before large numbers of Stasi records had been destroyed, removed or forged. Consequently, vetting and lustration have been successful and have enjoyed public confidence.
Although how to interpret the records has been the subject of much dispute (in Germany as everywhere else), few objections have been raised to their reliability. 66 
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Those who pressed for de-communization in Romania were in a much weaker position. Shedding light on the past was above all the cause of former political prisoners (a dwindling number of people). However, the political position of the Communists was too strong, authoritarian political traditions were too entrenched, the courts too craven and compromised, and the organizations of civil society too weak for them to achieve anything but slow and partial progress. The failure to expose police informers in public office may undermine confidence in Romania's democratic institutions for a long time to come. 67 It has certainly diminished the political will in Romania for prosecution of people for serious crimes and grave infringements of human rights. In its turn, the failure to prosecute these people may also long weaken public confidence in democratic institutions and the rule of law. Germany's trials have enjoyed public confidence and have, for most, further made the case for the democratic Rechtsstaat (state based on law).
While the BStU's findings as to who the Stasi's informers were have attracted very little criticism, the same is not true of those of Romania's CNSAS. One grave mistake made in Romania was to make the National Council's leadership political nominees.
This made it partisan and undermined public confidence in its work. The courts are also partisan and it is unlikely that lustration will make progress now that they are in the driving seat. By contrast, Germany's Federal Commissioner, who is elected by the Bundestag, is not politically partisan. His/her office is independent of the political parties; its work has not served their interests. 
